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I. INTRODUCTION
A Florida-based distributor is being sued by multiple producers
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who each filed suit in their respective district courts of New York, Cali-
fornia, Virginia, and Florida. Each producer is suing the distributor for
breach of contract, and the Florida producer also filed suit for copyright
infringement, which put their suit in federal district court. Because the
individual lawsuits share common parties and factual issues, they are
ultimately consolidated into a multidistrict litigation (“MDL”). Post-
consolidation, the producers now wish to depose the distributor’s
accountant, but some of the districts from which the individual lawsuits
hail recognize an accountant-client privilege and others do not. How
does the MDL court handle the accountant-client privilege in this case?
Should it apply the privilege in the consolidated proceedings although
the privilege would not have otherwise applied in some of the districts
where the suits were originally filed? Would a blanket application or
denial of the privilege result in inequities? If so, for whom? These are all
questions that have yet to be decisively answered by any court.
This note argues that courts should adopt a new federal common
law rule that allows the accountant-client privilege to apply to all liti-
gants in an MDL proceeding when the privilege would have been recog-
nized and applied in at least one of the original lawsuits before
consolidation. Such a common law rule would not run afoul of Erie1 or
other federalist concerns, would be an easy rule to apply with very little
associated costs, and would ultimately streamline the process and
advance the efficiency of MDL proceedings.
Part II of this note will provide a general background and history of
multidistrict litigation and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(“JPML”). Part III will then discuss federal and state privilege rules,
specifically the accountant-client privilege. Part IV will then explore the
choice of law rules of New York, California, and Virginia, as well as the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding conflict of law and choice of
law questions under Erie. Part V will then analyze the likely outcome of
the distributor’s hypothetical lawsuits given New York, Virginia, and
California choice of law rules, highlighting the disagreement between
each state’s approach to another state’s privilege in diversity jurisdiction
and illuminating the difficult decision an MDL court would be faced
with when determining the rule of law to apply in a proceeding involv-
ing all states. Finally, Part VI proposes a new federal common law rule
that should be recognized in the context of multidistrict litigation. The
new rule would mandate that an accountant-client privilege apply to all
parties in an MDL proceeding when at least one party relied on the priv-
ilege. This new rule would promote both predictability and efficiency in
1. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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multidistrict litigation, thereby saving courts and litigants both time and
money.
II. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION AND THE JPML
Multidistrict litigation is the consolidation of discovery proceedings
for multiple cases brought in different federal district courts into one
large proceeding in a single federal district court.2 Multidistrict litigation
has become an increasingly important method of efficiently resolving
multi-jurisdictional civil disputes because it allows for the consolidation
of cases for pretrial proceedings without requiring the “high degree of
cohesion to warrant representative litigation” that is mandatory for a
class action suit.3 Because differences between the consolidated cases
are allowed, MDL cases are “not quite as aggregated as a class action,
but consolidated to a significant degree.”4 Therefore, multidistrict litiga-
tion is regarded as a highly desirable way to consolidate the time and
efforts of the already overloaded court system.5
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has approval power
over requests for MDL consolidation and is staffed by “seven circuit and
district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice of the
United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit.”6 Panel
appointment terms are not strictly defined but are generally staggered
terms of seven years.7 The consolidation and transfer of pretrial proceed-
ings of an action may be initiated either by a party to such action or by
the panel itself,8 although the latter is not common.9 When the JPML is
presented with a motion for consolidation, it will only consider: (1)
whether the civil actions currently pending in different districts share
one or more common question of fact; and (2) whether the transfer of
2. See An Introduction to the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, U.S.
JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML-Over
view-Brochure-10-16-2014.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Introduction to the JPML]
(discussing the origins and purpose of multidistrict litigation and the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, which approves or denies motions for consolidation to multidistrict
litigation courts, and the factors the panel considers in those decisions).
3. Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict
Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 793 (2012).
4. Id.
5. Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation?
The Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
424, 432 (2013) (“MDL litigation has evolved such that it is responsive and flexible to the
changing environment, making it attractive to litigants.”).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2012).
7. John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225,
2227 (2008).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c).
9. Heyburn, supra note 7, at 2231 n.35.
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proceedings would be “for the convenience of parties and witnesses and
w[ould] promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.”10 It is
important to understand—particularly for the purposes of this note—that
the JPML does not consider the law that a transferee court might apply if
a consolidated action is assigned to it, nor does it consider if that court’s
choice of law rules will create a bias against one party.11 If the JPML
determines that consolidation is appropriate, it will assign the centralized
action to the court it deems most capable of handling the matters
presented in the case, provided that court consents to the assignment.12
The panel is typically not limited by traditional constraints of jurisdic-
tion or venue and may therefore choose to assign the consolidated matter
to any district it deems fit.13 The panel’s decisions are effectively bind-
ing—a denial of a motion for consolidation is final, and in the history of
the JPML’s existence, a decision by the panel to consolidate and transfer
a case has never been overturned.14
If the JPML denies a motion to transfer, there is no appeals pro-
cess,15 and if the JPML grants a motion to transfer, that decision is “only
appealable via petitions of extraordinary writ to the appropriate circuit
court.”16 Appeals from JPML transfer decisions are therefore extremely
rare.17 It is also important to note that when these cases are consolidated,
the MDL court to which the consolidated case is assigned will typically
only conduct the pretrial proceedings and then remand each case back to
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
11. See Mark A. Hill, Note, Opening the Door for Bias: The Problem of Applying Transferee
Forum Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 345 (2009) (“[T]he JPML
has stated in clear terms that ‘[w]hen determining whether to transfer an action under Section
1407, . . . it is not the business of the Panel to consider what law the transferee court might
apply.’”) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1546, 1547
(J.P.M.L. 1988)).
12. Id.
13. In re Aircraft Accident at Barrow, Alaska, on Oct. 13, 1978, 474 F. Supp. 996, 999
(J.P.M.L. 1979) (“The Panel’s discretion under Section 1407 is not limited by venue
considerations, . . . and the fact that defendants may not all be amenable to suit in the same
jurisdiction does not prevent transfer to a single district for pretrial proceedings where the
prerequisites of Section 1407 are otherwise satisfied.”). The requirements of subject matter
jurisdiction still apply to MDL courts, but given the nature of the parties who would find
themselves in an MDL proceeding—presumably from different states or districts—and the
relatively low monetary threshold of only $75,000 that is necessary for diversity jurisdiction,
MDL courts almost always have subject matter jurisdiction through diversity of citizenship. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
14. Williams & George, supra note 5, at 427 n.14 (“Based on an extensive search, we failed
to locate a single instance where the grant of a transfer motion was overturned.”); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1407(e).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (“There shall be no appeal or review of an order of the panel denying
a motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated proceedings.”).
16. Hill, supra note 11, at 347.
17. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA301.txt unknown Seq: 5  2-SEP-15 13:29
2015] ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 837
its original district for trial.18 Therefore, unless the consolidated action is
terminated in the MDL court or before the conclusion of the pretrial
proceedings, litigants will still have their day in court within the district
they initially chose to file suit.19
III. PRIVILEGE LAWS AND FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501
After many actions are consolidated into a single MDL proceeding,
choice of law issues may arise, especially surrounding the application of
state-created privileges. Federal courts look to Federal Rule of Evidence
501 for guidance on claims of privilege, but Rule 501 provides little
direction to the MDL court faced with conflicting state laws. Instead,
Rule 501 simply states that “in a civil case, state law governs privilege
regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of
decision.”20
As a policy matter, excluding confidential communications from
evidence “fosters socially desirable confidences” that allows parties in
privileged relationships to communicate freely without fear of future
disclosure.21 Rule 501 provides that “the common law—as interpreted
by the United States courts in the light of reason and experience”—
governs all claims of privilege unless the United States Constitution, a
federal statute, or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide other-
wise.22 And, as stated above, Rule 501 further provides that in a civil
case, “state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which
state law supplies the rule of decision.”23 Rule 501 therefore embodies
the Rules of Decision Act, which codified federal courts’ reliance on
applicable state laws in the absence of a governing federal statute.24 In
the absence of a federal statute that clearly enunciates a rule of law
regarding privileges, federal courts are therefore bound to follow the
applicable state laws or common law as directed in Rule 501. However,
the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of Rule 501’s “glaring
omission”—its “failure to identify which state’s law applies to the claim
18. Introduction to the JPML, supra note 2.
19. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weis Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 27 (1998) (“A
district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to § 1407(a) has no authority to invoke
§ 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial.”).
20. FED. R. EVID. 501.
21. Jack B. Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another
Jurisdiction, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 536 (1956).
22. FED. R. EVID. 501.
23. Id.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”).
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of privilege.”25
A. The Accountant-Client Privilege
The accountant-client privilege is statutorily recognized by several
states, including Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, and Louisiana, among several others.26 However, no
“confidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no
state-created privilege has been recognized in federal cases.”27 The
accountant-client privilege is intended “‘to encourage people to make
use of professional accounting services and to be frank and candid with
such professionals.’”28 But because there is no common law recognition
of the accountant-client privilege, and because of the viewpoint that
“evidentiary privileges impede the search for truth,” the accountant-cli-
ent privilege is often construed very narrowly.29
For example, Florida’s accountant-client privilege is codified under
the state evidence code at § 90.5055 and provides for a narrow applica-
tion of the accountant-client privilege contingent upon several require-
ments.30 The Florida privilege applies only to communications between
an accountant who is a certified public accountant and a client who is a
“person, public officer, corporation, association, or other organization or
entity . . . who consults an accountant with the purpose of obtaining
accounting services.”31 The privilege is further limited in that it only
applies if the communication is confidential, which means that the com-
munication is “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other
than . . . [t]hose to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of
accounting services to the client” or those to whom disclosure is “rea-
sonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.”32
25. Donald W. Price, A Choice of Law Analysis of Evidentiary Privileges, 50 LA. L. REV.
157, 160 (1989).
26. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-749 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107
(West 2014); Fla. STAT. ANN. § 90.5055 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-3-29 (West 2003);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203A (West 2014); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 450/27 (West 2013); IND. CODE
ANN. § 25-2.1-14-1 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-401 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:86 (2013).
27. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (citations omitted).
28. Noah P. Barsky et al., Protecting a Client’s Confidences: Recent Developments in
Privileged Communication Between Attorneys and Accountants, 28 J.L. & COM. 211, 220 (2010)
(quoting Zepter v. Dragisic, 237 F.R.D. 185, 189 (N.D. Ill. 2006)).
29. Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 130 (2003); see also Barsky et al., supra note 28, at
220.
30. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5055.
31. Id. § 90.5055 (1)(a)–(b).
32. Id. § 90.5055 (1)(c).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA301.txt unknown Seq: 7  2-SEP-15 13:29
2015] ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 839
IV. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Because conflicting state laws are a relatively common problem
faced by federal courts sitting in diversity, each state also has its own
choice of law rules that help federal courts determine what laws should
apply to a given case. “Conflict of [l]aws is that part of the law of each
state which determines what effect is given to the fact that the case may
have a significant relationship to more than one state.”33
A. State Choice of Law Rules
Choice of law rules inform federal courts on how “to determine the
rights and liabilities of the parties resulting from an occurrence involv-
ing foreign elements.”34 Choice of law rules also provide a framework
for a court to determine “whether particular issues in a suit involving
foreign elements should be determined by its own local law rules or by
those of another state.”35 Factors that are often considered relevant in
choice of law issues include:
the relevant policies of the forum, the relevant policies of other inter-
ested states and the relative interests of those states in the determina-
tion of the particular issue, the protection of justified expectations,
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, certainty, pre-
dictability and uniformity of result, and ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied.36
“Choice of law determinations are . . . made in a ‘horizontal’ setting, i.e.,
in determining which state’s . . . law to apply to an issue, with respect to
a transaction touching on two or more jurisdictions.”37
If there were no MDL consolidation of the hypothetical lawsuits
between the distributor and its various producers in Florida, California,
Virginia, and New York, each lawsuit would proceed separately in the
district courts of those states. But each district court would still need to
use its state’s choice of law rules to decide whether the laws of the state
in which it sits or the laws of Florida would apply.38 This decision could
greatly affect the evidence and testimony procured in each proceeding
because Florida law recognizes an accountant-client privilege,39 but Cal-
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: SUBJECT MATTER OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 2 (1971).
34. Id. § 2 cmt. a.
35. Id.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES § 6 (1971)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT: CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES] .
37. Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the
Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1236 (1999).
38. RESTATEMENT: CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, § 6 (“A court, subject to
constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.”).
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5055 (West 2014).
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ifornia, Virginia, and New York law do not. If the distributor’s commu-
nications with its accountant are central to the case, whether or not those
communications are privileged is a pivotal question that would likely
impact the final outcome of the lawsuit. Therefore, it is important to
consider each state’s choice of law rules and whether Florida’s account-
ant-client privilege would be applied under those rules.
1. NEW YORK
New York’s Jurisprudence on Conflict of Laws states that
“[m]atters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum, and the
forum court, subject to constitutional limitations, employs its own law to
determine whether a particular matter is to be classified as procedure or
substance, for conflict of law purposes.”40 It goes on to define proce-
dural law as “the mode of enforcing a legal right” and substantive law as
a “law that gives or declares the right. Thus, matters dealing with the
conduct of the litigation are procedural, and everything else is substan-
tive.”41 The application of Florida’s accountant-client privilege in the
New York suit would therefore depend on the New York court’s classi-
fication of the privilege as substantive or procedural. There is also New
York case law that supports the proposition that “New York choice of
law gives ‘controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because
of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation,’” which,
in that case, meant that New York law applied.42
2. VIRGINIA
Virginia seems to follow “traditional conflict-of-law rules[ ] when
presented with a choice of law question,” which means that Virginia
courts determine “‘whether an issue is procedural [lex fori] or substan-
tive [lex loci] according to [Virginia] conflict of law rules.’”43 Virginia’s
conflict of law rules adhere to the “territorial approach” embodied in the
Restatement (First) Conflict of Laws, which provides that “‘[t]he law of
the forum determines the admissibility of a particular piece of evi-
dence.’”44 Since the accountant-client privilege acts as the gatekeeper of
40. JAMES L. BUCHWALTER & TODD NEILSON, 19A NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE: CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 4 (2d ed. 2014).
41. Id.
42. Tartaglia v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 948 F. Supp. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation
omitted) (holding that in a breach of contract action in federal court under diversity jurisdiction,
New York’s conflict of law rules dictated that New York’s substantive law of privileges should
apply in a discovery dispute between litigants from New York and Ohio).
43. Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 459 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465 (E.D. Va. 2006).
44. E. Todd Presnell & James A. Beakes, The Application of Conflict of Laws to Evidentiary
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otherwise admissible testimony (i.e., evidence), Virginia would use its
own laws to determine the privilege’s application.
3. CALIFORNIA
When California courts are presented with a choice of law problem,
they “adhere to the governmental interest approach, the objective of
which is to determine the law that most appropriately applies to the issue
involved.”45 A California court “has a definite interest in applying [Cali-
fornia] law, which will be displaced only if there is a compelling reason
for doing so.”46 The “governmental interest analysis” is a three-step pro-
cess: first, “the foreign law proponent must identify the applicable rule
of law in each potentially concerned state and must show it materially
differs from the law of California.”47 Second, and assuming the laws of
the foreign state and California are indeed materially different, the court
must “determine what interest, if any, each state has in having its own
law applied to the case.”48 Third, and only if there is truly a material
difference between the laws and each state has established an interest in
having its own law applied, the court will “select the law of the state
whose interests would be more impaired if its law were not applied.”49
California’s choice of law rules therefore require a fact-intensive
inquiry, the outcome of which is difficult to predict.
4. FLORIDA
Of the four hypothetical lawsuits, only the Florida suit would not
require a conflict of laws analysis because there would be no diversity of
citizenship and therefore no choice of law issue presented. Florida law
would unequivocally apply. However, it is worth mentioning as a point
of interest that Florida’s conflict of laws jurisprudence requires the court
to consider “the policies of both the forum state and other interested
states[,]” but a Florida court “is not permitted to apply laws of another
forum if such action would be repugnant to Florida public policy.”50
Privileges, in EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 159, 163 (Def. Research Inst.
2008) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (1934)).
45. NANCY YUENGER, 12 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE: CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27 (3d ed.
2014).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 28.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. JOY T. COOK CARMICHAEL, 10 FLORIDA JURISPRUDENCE: CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (2d ed.
2014).
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B. Federal Choice of Law Jurisprudence
The United States’ current jurisprudence on federal choice of law
questions is derived from a combination of several cases that were
decided over a span of approximately sixty years. A brief description of
the most important cases (at least for the purposes of this note) and their
contributions to federal choice of law jurisprudence follows.
1. ERIE
The Erie Court interpreted the Rules of Decision Act51 as requiring
that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of
the state in which it sits.52 Erie applies “in a ‘vertical’ setting, where the
action is being heard in a federal court based on a claim arising under
state law, and where it is necessary to determine whether the federal
court may apply federal law or whether it must apply state law . . . .”53 It
was originally believed that Erie “commanded the application of state
law to substantive issues, but permitted federal courts to handle proce-
dural problems their own way.”54 Several years after the decision, Erie
was described by the Court as “considerably more protective of state
prerogatives . . . requiring the application of state law whenever apply-
ing federal law instead might generate a different outcome.”55 The pri-
mary importance of the Erie decision was the protection it afforded to
state-citizen defendants from non-citizen plaintiffs who might otherwise
have used diversity of citizenship to circumvent state laws that were
unfavorable to their case.56 The Erie decision did not, however, address
“whether federal courts sitting in diversity would be required to apply
state choice-of-law rules.”57 Courts interpreting Erie have since con-
cluded that a federal court must use the choice of law rules of the forum
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
52. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
53. Bauer, supra note 37, at 1236.
54. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 696 (1974).
55. Id.; see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945) (“[S]ince a federal
court adjudicating a State-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties
is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right
to recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the
right as given by the State.”).
56. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–75 (“Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to
prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State. Swift v.
Tyson[, 41 U.S. 1 (1842),] introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It
made rights enjoyed under the unwritten ‘general law’ vary according to whether enforcement was
sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right
should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen.”).
57. Bradt, supra note 3, at 769.
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in which it sits, pursuant to the subsequent case of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co.58
2. KLAXON
Klaxon was a breach of contract suit filed in Delaware federal court
on the basis of diversity in which the Supreme Court faced the question
of whether federal courts sitting in diversity “must follow conflict of
laws rules prevailing in the states in which they sit.”59 The respondent
was a New York corporation that had been awarded a $100,000 jury
verdict and then moved to correct the judgment amount to include inter-
est accrued, citing a New York state statute which required that interest
be added to the principal sum of damages in contract actions.60 The dis-
trict court granted the motion, and the circuit court of appeals affirmed,61
but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed and remanded the case
for a decision consistent with Delaware’s conflict of law rules.62 The
Court reasoned that under Erie, “the proper function of the Delaware
federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to
be,” and as such “[t]he conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal
court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware state
courts.”63
3. VAN DUSEN
Nearly two decades later, in Van Dusen v. Barrack,64 the Supreme
Court ironed out the “final wrinkle in choice-of-law analysis under the
Erie and Klaxon cases”65—the question of what state’s law applies after
transfer or change of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.66 The plain-
tiffs in Van Dusen were personal representatives—qualified as such
58. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
59. Id. at 494.
60. Id. at 494–95.
61. Id. at 495–96 (“[T]he rules for ascertaining the measure of damages are not a matter of
procedure at all, but are matters of substance which should be settled by reference to the law of the
appropriate state according to the type of case being tried in the forum. The measure of damages
for breach of a contract is determined by the law of the place of performance . . . .”).
62. Id. at 498. “The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must
conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts. Otherwise, the accident of diversity of
citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal
courts sitting side by side.” Id. at 496.
63. Id. at 496–97.
64. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
65. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4506 (2d ed. 2014).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought . . . .”).
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under Pennsylvania law—of the victims of a 1960 plane crash who
brought wrongful death actions against the defendants, including the
responsible airline and manufacturers, the United States, and the Massa-
chusetts Port Authority.67 The defendants moved to transfer the actions
filed from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the District of Massa-
chusetts68 under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).69 The potential recovery for a
wrongful death action under the Massachusetts Death Act was signifi-
cantly restricted in comparison to the Pennsylvania law on recovery of
damages—therefore, a transfer to the District of Massachusetts and
application of its laws would have been beneficial to the defendants and
detrimental to the plaintiffs’ potential recovery.70
The district court granted the motion to transfer, but on a writ of
mandamus the court of appeals subsequently found that the transfer was
prohibited because “a § 1404(a) transfer could be granted only if at the
time the suits were brought, the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massa-
chusetts, the State of the transferee District Court.”71 Because the plain-
tiffs were not qualified as personal representatives under Massachusetts
law, transfer to the District of Massachusetts was not allowed. The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding that the § 1404(a)
requirement of “might have been brought” referred to the capacity to file
suit as dictated by federal law and did not refer to the capacity of a
personal representative to bring suit under a transferee state’s laws.72
The Court reasoned that the “‘accident’ of federal diversity [should] not
enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court
which could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where the
action was filed.”73 The Court concluded that when a defendant seeks
transfer of an action, the transferee court is “obligated to apply the state
law that would have been applied had there been no change in venue,”
so that “[a] change in venue under § 1404(a) . . . , with respect to state
law, [is merely] a change of courtrooms.”74 The Court was careful to
construe its holding narrowly and declined to comment on the outcome
of a case in which the plaintiff was the party to seek transfer.75 However,
the case of Ferens v. John Deere Co. later extended the Van Dusen rule
to plaintiffs’ motions to transfer as well.76
67. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 614.
68. Id.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
70. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 627.
71. Id. at 614.
72. Id. at 624.
73. Id. at 638.
74. Id. at 639.
75. Id. at 640.
76. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
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4. BYRD
The Supreme Court’s “most comprehensive and cogent effort in
vertical choice of law”77 came in the case of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative,78 which is “the only Supreme Court case since
Erie itself to discuss all three of the core interests balanced, expressly or
not, in every vertical choice of law case.”79
Byrd was initially filed in a South Carolina district court based on
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.80 The plaintiff was a North Carolina
resident and a “lineman in the construction crew of a construction con-
tractor” who was hired by the defendant—an electric company and
South Carolina corporation—to erect new power lines, convert existing
power lines to higher capacity lines, and build new substations and
breaker stations.81 The plaintiff sustained injuries while on the job and
sued the defendant for negligence, receiving a jury verdict in his favor at
the district court level.82 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and directed entry of judgment for the defendant, after which the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and ordered reargument of the issues.83
Central to the dispute was the factual determination of whether or
not the plaintiff was a statutory employee of the defendant, and whether
the judge or the jury should make that determination.84 The defendant
cited as an affirmative defense the South Carolina Workmen’s Compen-
sation Act, which barred a statutory employee from suing his employer
and “obliged [the employee] to accept statutory compensation benefits
as the exclusive remedy for his injuries.”85 The defendant then argued
that a previous South Carolina State Supreme Court decision, Adams v.
Davison-Paxon Co.,86 which held that it was “for the judge and not the
jury to decide on the evidence [who] was a statutory employer,” should
control in the case under Erie in order “to secure uniform enforcement
of the immunity created by the State.”87
The Court established and followed a three-part analysis in its con-
sideration of the issues of the case. First, under the direction of Erie, the
Court found that it was required to “respect the definition of state-cre-
77. Richard D. Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The Irrepressible Influence of Byrd, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 61, 62 (2010).
78. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
79. Freer & Arthur, supra note 77, at 62.
80. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 526.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 528.
85. Id. at 527.
86. 96 S.E.2d 566 (S.C. 1957).
87. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 534.
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ated rights and obligations by the state courts.”88 The Court thus
examined the rule enunciated by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Adams “to determine whether [the rule] is bound up with these rights
and obligations in such a way that its application in the federal court is
required.”89 From this the Court found that the requirement that a judge,
rather than a jury, determine the factual question of immunity under the
South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act was “merely a form and
mode of enforcing the immunity . . . and not a rule intended to be bound
up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties.”90 Sec-
ond, the Court acknowledged that the Erie doctrine
evinced a broader policy to the effect that the federal courts should
conform as near may be—in the absence of other considerations—to
state rules even of form and mode where the state rules may bear
substantially on the question of whether the litigation would come out
one way in the federal court and another way in the state court if the
federal court failed to apply a particular local rule.91
On this point, the Court noted that the issue of immunity was not one in
which it was clear that the result would be substantially affected by
whether the determination was made by a judge or a jury.92 Because of
this, the Court did “not think that the likelihood of a different result
[was] so strong as to require the federal practice of jury determination of
disputed factual issues to yield to the state rule in the interest of uni-
formity of outcome.”93
Finally, the Court ended its analysis by noting that even if applica-
tion of the state rule was clearly outcome determinative, there were
“affirmative countervailing considerations at work”—specifically the
independence of the federal system and the command of the Seventh
Amendment to “assign[ ] the decisions of disputed questions of fact to
the jury”—which weighed heavily against application of the state rule in
federal court.94 The Court thus held that the federal district court was not
obligated to follow the South Carolina state rule, because “[t]he policy
of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obliga-
tions . . . cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule—not
bound up with rights and obligations—which disrupts the federal system
of allocating functions between judge and jury.”95
88. Id. at 525.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 536.
91. Id. at 536–37.
92. Id. at 539.
93. Id. at 537–40.
94. Id. at 537.
95. Id. at 537–38.
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V. THE ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS: YES, NO, AND MAYBE
Given the precedential backdrop of Erie, Klaxon, Van Dusen, and
Byrd, would one state’s accountant-client privilege apply to all litigants
in a multidistrict litigation? The answer to that question is answered in
part by whether the privilege would apply in the district courts of each
state, which is dictated by each state’s choice of law rules. In the four
hypothetical lawsuits, the Florida accountant-client privilege would
likely apply in New York and California district court proceedings, but
would likely not apply in a Virginia district court.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, “in a civil case, state law
governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law sup-
plies the rule of decision.”96 But Rule 501 does not provide guidance on
which state’s substantive law will apply in a controversy between parties
in a federal court sitting in diversity. Under the rule of Klaxon, a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules that would
have applied had the suit been filed in state court—subject of course to
the rules of Van Dusen and Ferens.97 Therefore, the “federal rule” of
privilege for a federal court sitting in diversity depends in large part on
the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits, provided that applica-
tion of the rules does not defeat the vertical uniformity required by Van
Dusen.
Returning once again to the hypothetical breach of contract suits in
New York, California, Virginia, and Florida, we must analyze the likeli-
hood that the Florida accountant-client privilege would be applied to the
lawsuits in each state’s district courts under their respective choice of
law provisions. The outcome under each state’s choice of law rules will
provide a standard against which we can then compare the outcome
under an MDL consolidation, and thus determine if MDL consolidation
would affect the application of the privilege.
A. New York
According to the New York Jurisprudence on Conflict of Laws,
New York choice of law rules turn on a substantive versus procedural
analysis of the foreign law to be applied.98 “Matters of procedure are
96. FED. R. EVID. 501.
97. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612 (1964) (upon a defendant’s motion for change of venue, the transferee court must
apply the state law that would have been applied in the transferor court); Ferens v. John Deere
Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (extending the Van Dusen rule to also apply in cases where the plaintiff
filed a motion for change of venue).
98. BUCHWALTER & NEILSON, supra note 40, § 4.
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governed by the law of the forum,” and the law of the forum court is
used to define what is procedural or substantive.99 Although New York
attempts to define the terms,100 in practice it is often the case that a rule
is both procedural and substantive because the two categories are not
always mutually exclusive. But in New York, “matters dealing with the
conduct of the litigation are procedural, and everything else is substan-
tive.”101 The accountant-client privilege arguably deals with the conduct
of the litigation, since it bars the disclosure of information during dis-
covery. But in truth, the accountant-client privilege acts as both “the
mode of enforcing [the] legal right”—by protecting the confidentiality
of communications between the accountant and client—and as the “law
that gives or declares the right”—by providing the assurance of future
confidentiality that allows for such confidential communications to take
place at all.102
There is also some New York case law that supports using an
“interest analysis,” in which “the governing law is that ‘of the jurisdic-
tion which, because of its relationship or contact with the parties, has the
greatest concern with the specific issues raised in the litigation.’”103
Under this analysis, Florida has an interest in protecting its citizens that
have relied upon a privilege, but New York has an arguably equal inter-
est in providing its citizens with a fair opportunity to seek the truth. In
practice, at least according to Lego v. Stratos Lightwave, Inc., when New
York courts are faced with “a choice of privilege law, the interest analy-
sis usually has led New York courts to apply the law of the jurisdiction
in which the assertedly privileged communications were made, which in
most of the cases was also the jurisdiction in which the party that made
the communications resided.”104 Therefore, a Florida corporation’s com-
munications with its Florida-based accountant would likely be protected
by the Florida accountant-client privilege even in New York federal
court.
B. Virginia
In Hatfill v. New York Times Co., the Eastern District Court of Vir-
ginia—sitting in diversity—was faced with the question of whether a
newspaper reporter’s privilege—statutorily recognized in New York and
Maryland, but not in Virginia—would apply in Virginia court proceed-
99. Id.
100. See id. (defining procedural law as “the mode of enforcing a legal right” and substantive
law as “law that gives or declares the right”).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Lego v. Stratos Lightwave, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 576, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
104. Id. at 579.
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ings.105 The court noted that “Virginia courts ha[d] not spoken specif-
ically on the issue of whether the law of privilege is procedural or
substantive,”106 but after considering Virginia Supreme Court precedent
that provided guidance on how to approach the question,107 the court
found that the reporter privilege was procedural.108 Therefore, Virginia
law applied to the issue, and because Virginia did not recognize a
reporter privilege, the privilege did not apply.
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the privilege was
in fact substantive by distinguishing the reporter privilege from other
recognized substantive privileges.109 For example, in Virginia, the phys-
ician-client privilege was a “qualified statutory privilege” because it not
only established a rule of evidence but also “provide[d] grounds for a
cause of action.”110 Meanwhile, Virginia had no statutory recognition of
the reporter privilege nor was there a cause of action available under
Virginia law for a reporter’s disclosure of a source’s identity.111 Thus,
the reporter privilege was procedural rather than substantive.
Given this jurisprudential backdrop, a district court in Virginia
would likely also classify the Florida accountant-client privilege as pro-
cedural rather than substantive because Virginia does not statutorily rec-
ognize its own accountant-client privilege, nor is there a cause of action
for a breach of an accountant-client privilege under Virginia law. Fur-
thermore, a reporter privilege and an accountant-client privilege are so
analogous that it is reasonable to assume Virginia courts would treat
them similarly. Although a reporter privilege protects the source of
information while the accountant-client privilege protects the informa-
tion itself, both function to prevent the admission of certain evidence
into a legal proceeding. Because the law of the forum governs matters of
procedure, Virginia law would apply. And because Virginia’s choice of
law standards dictate that Virginia law be used to determine the admissi-
bility of evidence,112 in a Virginia district court the accountant-client
communications would probably be admitted, and the Florida privilege
would not be upheld.
105. Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 459 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464–66 (E.D. Va. 2006).
106. Id. at 465.
107. The court specifically relied on the 1932 Virginia Supreme Court case of Baise v. Warren,
which held, in part, that the admissibility of evidence in an automobile tort action was governed
by the laws of Virginia, even though the tort occurred in North Carolina, and North Carolina law
governed the plaintiff’s right of recovery. See Baise v. Warren, 164 S.E. 655, 656 (Va. 1932).
108. Hatfill, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
109. Id. at 466 n.4.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Presnell & Beakes, supra note 44, at 163.
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C. California
Under the California “governmental interest analysis,” once a Cali-
fornia court sitting in diversity determines that California and Florida
privilege laws differ regarding the accountant-client privilege, it would
then “carefully evaluate[ ] and compare[ ] the nature and strength of the
interest of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law ‘to deter-
mine which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were
subordinated to the policy of the other state.’”113 The state whose inter-
ests would be most damaged if its laws are not applied is then ultimately
the state whose laws would prevail.114
The first prong of the analysis is fairly simple—Florida statutorily
recognizes an accountant-client privilege while California does not.
Therefore, the laws are indeed different. But a comparison of each
state’s interests in the application of its own law is where complications
arise. California arguably has an interest in denying the privilege in
order to avail its citizens of full discovery for their claims, but Florida
also has an interest in protecting its citizens who conducted their busi-
ness in reliance on the privilege. The balance of these interests could
also be tipped by other factors such as the context in which the case
arose, the facts of the case, and the number and type of litigants involved
from each state. California’s choice of law rules therefore provide a flex-
ible analysis that leads to some unpredictability.
Under the bare facts presented in our hypothetical lawsuit, a Cali-
fornia district court would likely find Florida’s interest in having its
privilege applied to be greater than California’s interest in applying its
own law because denying the privilege would irreversibly deny protec-
tion to Florida citizens who had relied upon that privilege. Therefore,
this note proceeds under the assumption that Florida’s accountant-client
privilege would apply in California district court. However, it is impor-
tant to note that where there are extenuating circumstances or additional
facts surrounding the case, California’s interest balancing analysis might
just as easily lead a district court to apply California law over Florida
law, thereby denying protection of the privilege.
VI. A NEW FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION:
BLANKET APPLICATION OF THE ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
“[T]he constitutional dicta of Erie suggests . . . that regardless of
what Congress might say, federal courts [are] bound to follow state priv-
113. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006) (quoting
Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal. 1976)).
114. Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 723.
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ilege law in diversity cases.”115 If a federal court is bound to follow a
state privilege in a diversity case where the parties are before the court
solely because of the accident of diversity, it is only logical that a court
would follow a state privilege in a case where the parties are before the
court only by the “accident” of consolidation. In fact, a litany of cases
support the proposition that the substantive law of the transferor court be
applied in the transferee court116—which is of course the essence of the
Van Dusen Court’s holding.117 If a new federal common law were
adopted in which the accountant-client privilege would be applied across
the board when at least one party had relied on the privilege, this would
allow the MDL court to circumvent difficult choice of law questions and
more expeditiously complete the consolidated pretrial proceedings.
Byrd “controls the analysis [when] there is no federal rule directly
on point.”118 An analysis under Byrd combines a contemplation of the
policy considerations that informed the Court’s decision in Erie plus a
consideration of balancing state and federal interests. Given that there is
no federal law specific to the application of an accountant-client privi-
lege, the “federal rule” in a simple diversity case in federal court would
be determined by Rule 501 and Erie. Rule 501 demands that “state law
govern[ ] privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law sup-
plies the rule of decision.”119 In the course of amending Rule 501 to read
as it does today, “the House Judiciary Committee noted that in diversity
cases . . . questions of privilege were ‘substantive’ and, therefore should
be governed by Erie . . . .”120 Assuming that questions of privilege are
indeed substantive,121 the state law regarding that privilege must apply.
Consequently, the next question is: When many states are involved,
which state’s substantive law applies?
Klaxon mandates that a federal court must apply the choice of law
115. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613, 624 (1976).
116. See, e.g., Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. v. Peter McNulty Law Firm, 692 F.3d 4 (1st Cir.
2012); In re Dow Co. “Sarabond” Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Colo. 1987); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975); In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws
Litig., 370 F. Supp. 219 (W.D. Okla. 1974); Phila. Housing Auth. v. Am. Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (“The applicable law to be applied in
Section 1407 transfers is the law of the transferor state.”).
117. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638–40 (1964) (requiring a transferee district court
to apply the rules that would have been applied in the transferor district court but for the change of
venue or transfer).
118. Kelly Amanda Blair, Note, A Judicial Solution to the Forum-Selection Clause
Enforcement Circuit Split: Giving Erie a Second Chance, 46 GA. L. REV. 799, 817 (2012).
119. FED. R. EVID. 501.
120. David E. Seidelson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Rule 501, Klaxon and the
Constitution, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 21, 26–27 (1976).
121. For an analysis of the accountant-client privilege as a substantive rule, see infra Part
VI.A.1.i.
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rules of the state in which it sits. New York and California’s choice of
law rules would probably lead to the application of the Florida account-
ant-client privilege,122 so it can be inferred from Klaxon that the Florida
accountant-client privilege would probably apply in the federal courts of
those states. But Virginia’s choice of law rules are not quite as solicitous
as New York’s and California’s, and so the Florida privilege would
likely not apply in a Virginia district court.123
Therefore, in a simple diversity of jurisdiction case, the current fed-
eral rule of law—Rule 501 as interpreted under Erie and Klaxon—
would mandate application of the accountant-client privilege in the fed-
eral courts of California, New York, and Florida, but contemporaneously
mandate the denial of that privilege in the federal courts of Virginia. So
when cases from each state’s respective district courts are consolidated
into one pretrial proceeding, the MDL court is faced with directly con-
flicting approaches to the privilege. This predicament could easily be
avoided if a new federal common law were adopted that mandated blan-
ket application of a state’s accountant-client privilege to all parties in an
MDL proceeding when any party to the proceedings had relied upon that
privilege. An analysis of this proposed federal common law under Byrd
supports its application over state law in multidistrict litigation.
A. An Analysis of the Blanket Privilege Rule Under Byrd
Under Byrd, if the rule in question is bound up in the right at issue,
so long as that rule is not outcome determinative—i.e., it would neither
encourage forum shopping nor cause inequitable administration of the
law—the federal rule on point should apply. Even if the rule in question
is outcome determinative, if there are countervailing affirmative consid-
erations that support applying the federal rule, Byrd dictates that federal
law should still apply.
1. “BOUND UP” IN THE RIGHT
At issue in the context of the accountant-client privilege in an MDL
proceeding is the right to candid and confidential communication
between an accountant and his client. The first question to consider
under a Byrd analysis is whether the protection of an accountant-client
privilege is “bound up with th[is] right[ ] . . . in such a way that its
application in the federal court is required,”124 or whether the state law
is merely a “form and mode” of enforcing the right.125
122. See discussion supra Parts V.A, V.C.
123. See discussion supra Part V.B.
124. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).
125. Id. at 536.
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The accountant-client privilege would likely fall within the former
category.126 A privilege is meaningless unless it is inextricably entwined
(or bound up) with the right to confidential communications. The
accountant-client privilege is not merely the mode by which communi-
cations are protected; it is also the means by which those communica-
tions are made in the first place.127 Modern interpretations of John
Henry Wigmore’s standards of privilege128 assume that a privilege
should be recognized if the communication it is intended to protect
would be chilled but for that privilege.129 The logic behind this theory is
that the recognition of such a privilege does not deny the court evidence
or communications that would have otherwise been available to it
because, had the privilege not existed, the communication would not
have taken place at all.130
The phraseology of “bound up” versus “form and mode” closely
mirrors the familiar comparison of substantive versus procedural rules.
Therefore, an analysis of the accountant-client privilege under a substan-
tive versus a procedural framework is an appropriate tool in predicting
whether the accountant-client privilege might be “bound up” in the right
or whether it is merely the “form and mode” of the right.
i. Accountant-Client Privilege: Procedural or Substantive?
Privilege rules are technically evidentiary rules, and “[e]videntiary
rules were once considered purely procedural”; however, due to modern
scholarship, courts now recognize that “a rule phrased in terms of evi-
dence may in fact be a rule of substantive law.”131 Privileges have been
126. This is merely a hypothesis given the fact that there is no case law regarding the “bound
up” language used in Byrd; “The Byrd concept of ‘bound up’ [was] never defined in so many
words and [was] ignored in subsequent cases.” Freer & Arthur, supra note 77, at 64.
127. See generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 3.2.3 n.82 (2014) (“In multiple Supreme Court decisions regarding
privileges, it has been accepted as true that privileges encourage and allow for confidential
communication that would otherwise not occur without said privilege.”).
128. John Henry Wigmore, renowned legal scholar and expert in the field of evidence, urged
the courts to construe existing privileges strictly and narrowly, and in doing so proclaimed an oft-
cited test for the creation of new privileges and the assessment of existing ones. Wigmore’s test
demands:
(1) The communications . . . originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed[;] (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties[;] (3) The relation must
be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered[;] (4)
The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Id. § 3.2.3.
129. Id. § 3.2.3 n.82.
130. Id.
131. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical
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said to be “the paradigm” of this kind of rule because “[t]hey are
intended to protect certain societal relationships and values, even though
such protections may impose significant costs upon the litigation pro-
cess.”132 Because of the tension between a privilege and “the promotion
of accurate fact-finding, privilege rules often create difficult choice-of-
law problems.”133
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were initially proposed, the
draft of Rule 501 promulgated by the Advisory Committee required that
“state-created privileges . . . be disregarded in diversity cases.”134 How-
ever, an “impressive number of comments poured in” opposing the
Advisory Committee’s approach, all of which “collectively reflected a
basic premise that state privilege laws represented a substantive legal
determination with respect to how certain relationships are to be regu-
lated or promoted.”135 In response to the overwhelming criticism, the
Advisory Committee subsequently changed Rule 501.136 The Rule now
reads:
The common law—as interpreted by the United States courts in the
light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless
any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitu-
tion; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But
in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or
defense for which state law supplies the rule of reason.137
The last sentence of the Rule has been interpreted to require that
federal courts sitting in diversity cases follow state-created privilege
laws, under the reasoning that “federal law should not supersede that of
the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent compelling
reason.”138
The prevailing view of state-created privileges is that they are “sub-
stantive rather than procedural in nature, and hence affect private con-
duct and not merely the process of litigation.”139 Accountant-client
privilege laws affect the prelitigation conduct of clients and accountants
who will act in accordance with the protections they believe that their
state will afford them. Therefore, the “public policy under th[e] theory
Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1781 (1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 138 cmt. c (1971)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1803.
134. Krattenmaker, supra note 115, at 639.
135. Id. at 640.
136. Id.
137. FED. R. EVID. 501.
138. Krattenmaker, supra note 115, at 640.
139. Martin I. Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Civil Litigation, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 923, 931 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[of excluding privileged communications] is effective at the point where
the communication takes place and not during the litigation.”140 Given
the professional nature of the relationship, accountants and their clients
are likely to be aware of the limits of the protection afforded to their
relationships by their state’s legislature and will be careful to work
within the confines of that protection. In some instances, clients might
not seek the advice of an accountant unless they know that their commu-
nications will remain privileged even if litigation ensues. When a court
is put in the position to choose to apply either the privilege rules of the
forum state that has no accountant-client privilege, or the law of a trans-
feree state which has chosen to regulate the accountant-client relation-
ship, the “latter . . . seems to accord best with the federalism values
underlying the state privilege rules in the first place: deference to the
sovereign whose interest and expertise in regulating the underlying rela-
tionship is implicated by enforcement of the privilege rule.”141 Alterna-
tively, a refusal to apply the transferee state’s privilege would
undermine the authority of that state whose legislature chose to regulate
the accountant-client relationship. A usurpation of one state’s positive
law and expressed interest in the regulation of a professional relationship
by another state’s lack thereof would otherwise yield a clearly inequita-
ble result. As previously stated, the purpose of the accountant-client
privilege is to encourage the use of accounting professionals and pro-
mote candid conversation with those professionals.142 Uncertain or
inconsistent application of that privilege would defeat its purpose
entirely.
The privilege is only effective if it is reliably employed to protect
state citizens who rely on the laws of the state in which they do business
for protection of confidential conversations, regardless of the state of
pretrial proceedings. If the privilege is not applied when a case happens
to be consolidated, the privilege is essentially useless. The same logic
applies to citizens who are considering bringing suit but are concerned
about their own accountant-client privilege being honored. If a potential
litigant sees that their case has the potential for consolidation at some
point, they may be hesitant to file suit if the application of the privilege
they relied upon is uncertain. The accountant-client privilege should thus
be treated as a substantive rule—or “bound up” in the right—and as
such should be adhered to for the entirety of an MDL pretrial proceed-
ing, even when the forum state and the other transferee states do not
recognize such a privilege.
140. Weinstein, supra note 21, at 536.
141. Dudley, supra note 131, at 1837.
142. See Barsky et al., supra note 28, at 219.
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2. OUTCOME DETERMINATIVE
“Under Byrd, the outcome-determinative nature of the conflict
between federal versus state law and the absence of any overwhelming
federal policies on point dictate that . . . state law controls.”143 As
already noted, there is no singular federal policy on the point of the
accountant-client privilege in multidistrict litigation.144 However, the
application of such a privilege is not outcome determinative in the con-
text of multidistrict litigation because the privilege would only apply to
the pretrial proceedings—litigants would still be free to pursue the pro-
tected information at a later time in the proceedings after the cases were
sent back to their respective states for trial. Application of the privilege
would only delay the gathering of certain information—not ban it. For
example, litigants whose states would not otherwise apply the privilege
could call the accountant to testify at trial in their filing state or depose
him after the consolidated discovery ends. A blanket privilege would
therefore only prevent those parties from garnering such information
during pretrial discovery, prevent those litigants who would not other-
wise be permitted to gain such information from doing so, and protect
from exposure those parties that reasonably relied on the privilege. In
fact, the Coordinating Committee for § 1407 contemplated the potential
need for additional discovery after an MDL case was remanded to its
original district and concluded that such discovery should be permit-
ted.145 Although the committee was specifically concerned with the par-
ties’ ability to conduct discovery surrounding issues of fact that were not
common to the MDL proceedings, the expectation that further discovery
would take place after remand bolsters the assumption that the parties
who would not otherwise be subject to the accountant-client privilege
would still have ample opportunity to discover in their district courts the
information that was protected during the MDL proceedings.
Given this guaranteed second chance that litigants will have to gar-
ner information after remand, it is unlikely that an MDL court’s applica-
tion of a state privilege would cause forum shopping or result in the
inequitable administration of the law.146 Therefore, the proposed federal
143. Blair, supra note 118, at 817.
144. See supra Part V.
145. A Proposal to Provide Pretrial Consolidation of Multidistrict Litigation: Hearing on S.
3815 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 56 (1967) (statement of Sen. Joseph D. Tydings) [hereinafter Hearing on
Proposal to Provide Pretrial Consolidation] (“The intent of the coordinating committee . . . is that
the necessary additional discovery with regard to issues of fact not national or not common to
other cases in the transferee district could be conducted once the case was remanded to the
transferor district for trial.”).
146. Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1573, 1584
n.59 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA301.txt unknown Seq: 25  2-SEP-15 13:29
2015] ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 857
common law of a blanket application of the privilege is not outcome
determinative and would be properly applied to MDL litigants under a
Byrd analysis.
3. COUNTERVAILING AFFIRMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Even if, arguendo, the proposed federal common law rule were out-
come determinative, it would still be properly applied under Byrd. Under
Byrd’s three-part analysis, even when a law is both bound up in the right
and outcome determinative, if there is a countervailing affirmative fed-
eral consideration that supports applying the federal rule rather than the
state rule, the federal rule still applies. The only countervailing affirma-
tive consideration actually discussed in Byrd was the command of the
Seventh Amendment, which “assigns the decisions of disputed questions
of fact to the jury” and was contrary to the state’s rule of tasking the
judge instead of the jury with the job of determining immunity under the
state statute.147
However, I would argue that in the context of multidistrict litiga-
tion, efficiency of pretrial proceedings should be recognized as a new
countervailing affirmative federal consideration. The federal govern-
ment has a strong policy interest in promoting efficient and effective
pretrial proceedings in multidistrict litigation. Inefficient pretrial pro-
ceedings in multidistrict litigation would in fact be contrary to the cen-
tral purpose of multidistrict litigation, as reflected by the text and
legislative history of § 1407.
A desire to promote efficiency was central to the first multidistrict
litigation proceedings. In the 1960s, over 1,800 related civil actions
against electrical equipment managers flooded the federal court sys-
tem.148 In an attempt to consolidate discovery efforts between the doz-
ens of federal courts involved in those actions, Supreme Court Chief
Justice Earl Warren established the Coordinating Committee for Multi-
ple Litigation of the United States District Courts.149 In 1968, Congress
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which created the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation—a formal successor to the Coordinating Committee—
and the formal process by which civil actions can be consolidated for
pretrial proceedings today.150 In addition to promoting the “convenience
147. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958). See also Gasperini v.
Ctr. for Humanities Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432–35 (1996) (recognizing the command of the
reexamination clause of the Seventh Amendment as a countervailing affirmative federal
consideration as well).
148. Heyburn, supra note 7, at 2226.
149. Id.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (“When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district
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of parties and witnesses” as well as the “just and efficient conduct of
such actions,” centralization of discovery proceedings also “avoid[s]
duplication of discovery . . . prevent[s] inconsistent pretrial rulings, and
. . . conserve[s] the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the
judiciary.”151
The concept of efficiency is omnipresent throughout the history of
multidistrict litigation: it was the driving force behind the establishment
of the original Coordinating Committee, it is specifically mentioned in
the text of § 1407,152 and the legislative history of § 1407 is rife with
references to efficiency as a necessity and how multidistrict litigation
would create such efficiencies in a system that was rapidly being over-
whelmed by mass litigation.153 Even the name of the subcommittee in
charge of proposing the multidistrict litigation legislation—the Subcom-
mittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery154—implies a focus on
the importance of efficiency in approaching the problem of uncoordi-
nated mass litigation.
If MDL courts applied a blanket privilege to all parties, a certain
element of predictability—and thus efficiency—would be added to
MDL proceedings. No time would be wasted by the court in conducting
convoluted and potentially incongruent choice of law analyses, and the
parties would not be forced to waste their time or resources in preparing
arguments as to why the privilege should or should not apply. Parties’
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial
panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for
such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just
and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at
or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district court from which it was
transferred . . . .”).
151. Id; see also Introduction to the JPML, supra note 2.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (“Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation . . . upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will . . .
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.”).
153. See, e.g., Hearing on Proposal to Provide Pretrial Consolidation, supra note 145, at 16
(statement of Hon. William H. Becker) (“The proposed new Section 1407 of Title 28, United
States Code . . . is calculated to increase the efficiency of the United States Courts in processing
multi-district litigation. Under the new Section 1407 the disposition of multi-district litigation can
be accelerated, and much time and expense of litigants, witnesses, and courts saved.”); id. at 17
(statement of Hon. William H. Becker) (“[C]entral coordinated management for pretrial purposes
is not only highly desirable but necessary in the interests of efficiency, economy, and the
administration of justice.”); id. at 29 (statement of Charles A. Bane, Esq.) (“[A] coordinated
program for national discovery will enable pretrial discovery to be carried out efficiently and
economically and permit the cases to be prepared for and brought to trial without delay.”); id.
at 55 (statement of Sen. Joseph D. Tydings) (“This legislation has to do with the orderly procedure
and efficiency of the operation of the courts in a type of litigation which, at least to date, is
primarily in the antitrust field, but . . . in the future [may involve] patent cases or aircraft disaster
cases, or many types of litigation other than antitrust.”).
154. See supra note 145.
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expectations will also be tempered in terms of what they might garner
from the discovery process, and they will be better situated to more effi-
ciently allocate their resources during the MDL proceedings if they
know that an important part of their discovery will occur after remand.
Given the origins and history of multidistrict litigation, it seems
clear that efficiency was a driving force behind the enactment of § 1407.
The federal government therefore has a countervailing affirmative inter-
est in maintaining that efficiency through a streamlined application of
the accountant-client privilege in MDL proceedings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Multidistrict litigation presents an opportunity for efficiency in oth-
erwise complex and complicated mass litigation actions. However, MDL
consolidation can also present new complications—such as when multi-
ple litigants in a single pretrial proceeding have relied on conflicting
state privilege laws. Although the choice of law rules of the majority of
states, including New York and California, would probably lead to the
application of the privilege regardless, a minority of states, such as Vir-
ginia, would not. A new federal common law rule whereby a state privi-
lege is applied to all litigants in MDL proceedings when at least one
party to the action relied on said privilege would both ensure the reliabil-
ity and integrity of a state’s privilege laws and eliminate uncertainty and
inefficiency in MDL courts. The doctrine of Byrd supports such a rule’s
application: although the rule may be bound up in the right, it is not
outcome determinative, and even if it were, a new countervailing affirm-
ative consideration—efficiency—supports application of a blanket privi-
lege to all litigants in a multidistrict litigation proceeding.
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